trial with a control group, laying out in detail many of the criteria that have since been adopted by scientists and regulatory agencies around the world. 4 The problem, for Calmette, was both political and practical. There were precious few places he could carry out such a study. He knew immediately that French family doctors and their powerful unions would block his efforts on the mainland. No other European country seemed any more hospitable, and he feared the likelihood of damaging publicity, especially after a laboratory error in Germany in 1930 killed dozens of infants and infected many others. 5 So he turned to French colonial populations: he worked first with African soldiers on the mainland, and when that failed to produce meaningful results, he moved his efforts overseas. 6 But the colonial territories he tried did not have adequate civil recordkeeping. He could vaccinate huge numbers of children, but he could not monitor them long enough to convince critics that his vaccine had given them protection. The only place experiencing rampant tuberculosis that also offered civil records he could use, without facing resistance from patients or their doctors, was neither colonial, in formal terms, nor part of the French mainland: Algeria. Invaded in 1830 and annexed four years later, the former Ottoman territory became part of France in 1848. When civil authorities took over from the military in 1870, the minister of the interior in Paris rather than the minister of colonies appointed its governor-general, who shared power with European settlers. 7 That quasi-colonial status, combining massive social and political inequality with a functioning administrative state, set Algeria apart and made it an ideal site for vaccine testing.
Calmette called on colleagues at the Algiers branch of the Pasteur Institute in League of Nations Health Organisation," Minerva 35, no. 3 (1997) Foundation, 1913 -1951 (Oxford, 2004 ; Susan Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations," American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (October 2007 ): 1091 -1117 and Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65 (New York, 2006) . 4 Harry M. Marks, The Progress of Experiment: Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 1900 (Cambridge, 1997 ; Christian Bonah, Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine en France: Discours et pratiques, 1900 -1940 (Paris, 2007 ; Desirée Cox-Maksimov, "The Making of the Clinical Trial in Britain, 1910 Britain, -1945 Development and European Expansion (Dordrecht, 1992) , [307] [308] [309] [310] [311] [312] [313] [314] [315] [316] [317] [318] [319] [320] [321] [322] ans de microbiologie française dans le monde (Paris, 2000) . 7 Claude Collot, Les institutions de l'Algérie durant la période coloniale, 1830 -1962 (Algiers, 1987 .
his bid to satisfy League statisticians. 8 Scientists used birth records held by the Government General to create a random sample and sent teams of nurses to the second arrondissement, the Kasbah, the poorest, most overcrowded neighborhood in the city. Those nurses delivered oral doses of BCG and observed a control group (without giving a placebo), returning periodically to provide boosters to the vaccinated and to monitor both groups' health. They tested and tracked some 40,000 subjects over the course of a generation, from 1930 to 1956. The Algiers BCG trial was the largest study of its kind carried out anywhere in the world before the Salk, Sabin, and Koprowski polio trials of the 1950s, which got under way just as the Algerian War put a stop to testing in Algiers. 9 Calmette's inability to carry out his experiment in a formal colony, such as Indochina or West Africa, shows the limitations of an approach to empire that has been enormously fruitful over the past generation. Colonial reformers routinely likened empire to the controlled conditions of the laboratory, and scholars of imperialism followed suit. Since Paul Rabinow and Gwendolyn Wright's landmark works in the 1980s, the metaphorical notion of colonies as "laboratories of modernity" has been 8 Calmette, "Quelques notes sur ma vie et ma carrière," fol. 25; M.-P. Laberge, "Les instituts Pasteur du Maghreb: La recherche scientifique dans le cadre de la politique coloniale," Revue française d 'histoire d'Outre-Mer 74 (1987) : 27-42; John Strachan, "The Pasteurization of Algeria?," French History 20, no. 3 (2006): 260-275. 9 John R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven, Conn., 1971) , 426-440; and David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story-The Crusade That Mobilized the Nation against the Twentieth Century's Most Feared Disease (Oxford, 2005) , chap. 12. 
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673 ubiquitous in the literature on empire. In this view, colonial settings, isolated from Europe and unencumbered by stifling regulations and domineering mainland mandarins, enabled mid-level experts-Rabinow calls them "specific intellectuals"-to elaborate new forms of social discipline from the Maghreb to Madagascar and French Indochina. Even earlier, one of Rabinow's mentors, Bernard Cohn, had called attention to the energy the British Raj devoted to marking boundaries between colonizers and colonized. 10 Work in this vein on the history of science has had the virtue of calling attention to scientific research that political and environmental conditions made impossible in Europe. 11 Increasingly, however, the idea of a distinct colonial modernity has come to seem problematic. Area studies specialists have long objected that colonies were never empty spaces that Europeans could manipulate at will. Latin Americanists have shown that nineteenth-century experiments in free trade depended upon financial institutions built by indigenous elites, not a power vacuum left by the collapse of Spanish authority. 12 More recently, international historians and immigration specialists have discovered the salience of juridical categories-protectorates, condominiums, mandates, dominions-too often lumped together as "colonial," which influenced how local administrative infrastructures related both to European capitals and to an increasingly dense international system. 13 Moreover, European colonies, as Meghan Vaughan has pointed out, were not modern states at all for most of their existence. They refused to treat colonial subjects as autonomous individuals, and they relied on brute force rather than Foucauldian discipline to impose their will. Other scholars, especially those working on penitentiaries, have gone so far as to describe the French Empire as a brutal throwback to an archaic, Old Regime style of governance. 14 Placing European mainlands, colonies, and quasi-colonial territories such as Algeria into a single analytical frame requires broad context. It requires breaking down a series of basic colonial oppositions, starting with colony/metropole and colonizer/ (Princeton, N.J., 1989) . 13 Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations"; Susan Pedersen, "The Meaning of the Mandates System: An Argument," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (2006) : 560-582; and Alexis Spire, É trangers à la carte: L'administration de l'immigration en France (1945 France ( -1975 Knowledge, 1870 -1950 (Chicago, 2011 and Deborah Neill, "Paul Ehrlich's Colonial Connections: Scientific Networks and Sleeping Sickness Drug Therapy Research, 1900 -1914 ," Social History of Medicine 22, no. 1 (2009 14 For the concept of discipline, see Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris, 1975 Vietnam, 1862 -1940 (Berkeley, Calif., 2001 colonized, and recognizing that the meanings of "tradition" and "modernity" were contested, not only overseas but in Europe as well. A generation of scholars have shown how colonized peoples adapted, appropriated, and translated Western scientific ideas in a wide range of contexts. 15 But the most influential currents of postcolonial scholarship continue to rely on a reductive notion of "post-Enlightenment rationality," a monolithic "imaginary figure . . . embedded in clichéd and shorthand forms" that Dipesh Chakrabarty calls a "hyperreal Europe." 16 Frederick Cooper has countered that these efforts to challenge European narratives of progress have too often simply reversed their value judgments without altering their terms: "the history they evoke is canned, a three-hundred-or four-hundred-year story that we need only name . . . Hegel stands in for a European history reduced to the claim of progress." 17 In the case of Calmette's human experiment, a complex interplay of colonial, national, and international forces shaped a major scientific dispute within Europe, a dispute within the Enlightenment tradition. In response to the League of Nations, Calmette took advantage of patronage networks that radiated out from Paris and bound colonies and quasi-colonial entities such as Algeria together with the metropole. It was the very depth of Algeria's implication in metropolitan webs of influence and power that enabled him to use the Kasbah as a laboratory. Like the Pasteur Institute's work on rabies in French Indochina and Madagascar and Robert Koch's on sleeping sickness (human trypanosomiasis) in German East Africa and Togobut unlike later work on sleeping sickness in sub-Saharan Africa, which was much more international-the Algiers trial calls to mind old-fashioned imperialism. A metropolitan research institute took advantage of opportunities created by overseas expansion. In this respect it was broadly similar to the trial of the contraceptive pill Enovid, launched in Puerto Rico in the 1950s to avoid the jurisdiction of the Comstock Laws, which made the testing of contraceptives illegal in most U.S. states. 18 If Calmette's experiment relied on a rather backward kind of power, it was no throwback to the Old Regime. The Algiers BCG trial stands at the crossroads of two 15 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, N.J., 1999) ; Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, Calif., 2007) ; Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo (Durham, N.C., 1999) ; Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley, Calif., 2000) ; and Julia Livingston, Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (Bloomington, Ind., 2005) . 16 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, N.J., 2000) , 3-4, 27, 37, 39-40, 45, emphasis Zaire, 1900 -1940 (Cambridge, 1992 momentous transitions: it provides an early example of an international agency dictating the terms on which scientific claims are evaluated, and at the same time it represents an important step in the emergence of recognizably modern clinical trials and, more broadly, in the spread of statistical modes of thinking. 19 The BCG trial also anticipated many of the moral and practical problems of human subject research in developing countries that have emerged as major concerns in the age of AIDS. 20 European scientists in Algiers were much less invasive than those in the British Raj, which experienced an outbreak of bubonic plague in the late nineteenth century, not to mention Victorian England, where mandatory vaccination laws provoked powerful resistance. 21 They did not withhold treatment, as Dr. Vonderlehr and his colleagues did in the notorious Tuskegee syphilis experiment in the United States. 22 In fact, they made routine care available to people in desperate need. In the process, the Algiers BCG trial created a new, triangular relationship between European researchers, poor African test subjects, and regulators in Geneva. The vast human experiment was controlled by experts and addressed concerns that had little if anything to do with conditions in the Maghreb, even as it provided access to cutting-edge care.
THE ALGIERS BCG TRIAL, like so many overseas experiments, resulted from the difficulty of carrying out research on the European mainland. 23 Calmette and his colleague Camille Guérin, a veterinarian, began to develop BCG at the Pasteur Institute laboratory in Lille, France, in 1905. They noticed that animals that ingested a small quantity of tuberculosis bacilli tested tuberculin-positive and developed a resistance to active TB. 24 They spent the better part of the next sixteen years developing culture media and conducting exhaustive animal testing to attenuate what remained a live virus and make it safe for use in humans. In 1921, after 230 successive cultures and repeated testing, they declared their attenuated virus completely safe, incapable of causing lesions even when injected in massive doses into the most sensitive laboratory animals. At that point, Calmette and Guérin felt they had exhausted the potential for animal testing. 25 Calmette and his colleagues studiously avoided mention of the term "human testing," which remained a particularly strong taboo in France, especially for live vaccines administered to otherwise healthy infants. 26 Testing vaccines on human subjects has always posed unique ethical, practical, and political problems. Vaccines, unlike other medications, expose patients to definite risk in order to combat an uncertain threat. The vaccinated, usually young children, run the risk of complications or, in rare cases, death to gain protection against a disease they may never contract. 27 There was tremendous optimism in the early twentieth century that vaccines could render infectious diseases obsolete. "It is within the power of man to eradicate infectious disease from the earth," Pasteur famously proclaimed. 28 That optimism, however, was tempered by memories of the resistance that compulsory vaccination against smallpox had provoked; Edward Jenner's smallpox vaccine remained the only one required by the French government until just before World War II. In this context, Calmette had to proceed cautiously and persuade the public that his new vaccine was safe and effective. 29 Above all, he had to convince doctors. General practitioners were uncommonly powerful in France and jealous of their prerogatives. 30 3, no. 3 (1991) : 31-54; Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon, "Le ommended a therapy without evidence that it worked; once convinced of its efficacy, however, they felt bound to provide it to their patients. Most independent doctors rejected the idea that any method, no matter how sophisticated, could surpass their own cultivated clinical judgment. The idea of leaving their patients' treatment to chance was anathema. The democracy of the French healthcare system, the disproportionate influence enjoyed by general practitioners at the expense of specialists and government ministries, has often been seen as a sign of backwardness. 31 Their power posed formidable challenges for research institutes and government agencies interested in applying new forms of applied mathematics to medical research and provided a powerful defense for the interests of individual patients at the expense of the community. It compelled Calmette to rush his work and attempt to keep debate from spilling over into the metropolitan public sphere.
The first human vaccinations with BCG took place in a Paris maternity ward in 1921. 32 Calmette later emphasized that the director of the Hôpital de la Charité's É cole de puériculture had asked for access to his new vaccine and offered to obtain parental permission to vaccinate children Calmette thought were certain to contract TB. By writing that a doctor had approached him-Calmette said he was "tormented" by the shift from animal to human subjects and "would likely have hesitated for quite some time"-the microbiologist distanced himself from accusations of human experimentation. 33 After seven years of testing, using an oral dose to ease compliance and avoid resistance even though it was known to be less effective, Calmette and his team showed that the vaccine was safe by taking temperature and weight readings of all the children and comparing them to established norms. 34 Establishing its efficacy, however, was much more difficult. 35 In order to prove that BCG worked, they would have to show that vaccinated children developed active TB less often than unvaccinated children. French doctors were not obligated to report TB cases; there were no definitive statistics. Calmette tried to resolve the issue by sending a questionnaire to 500 dispensaries around France. From the replies, he calculated an infant mortality rate of 24 percent. That is, he claimed that 24 out of every 100 children in France would die within their first year if one of their immediate relatives had a declared case of active TB. Law and Medicine, 1920 -1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., 2012 , chaps. 1-3. For comparison, see Michael H. Kater, "Professionalization and Socialization of Physicians in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany," Journal of Contemporary History 20, no. 4 (1985) : 677-701. 31 In particular by Murard and Zylberman, L'hygiène dans la République, and following them, Baldwin, Contagion and the State.
32 Weill-Hallé and Turpin, "Premiers essais de vaccination antituberculeuse." 33 Calmette, La vaccination préventive contre la tuberculose par le "BCG," 186. 34 Ibid., 186, 212-213. The dose had to be delivered in the first ten days, so that it could be absorbed properly. Yet the boosters given after that initial period were still given orally rather than by injection. 35 Bonah, Histoire de l'expérimentation humaine, chap. 4. 36 Infection with the TB bacillus, testing "tuberculin-positive," may or may not lead to active disease. In most cases, infection creates a primary lesion, usually in the lungs, within four to twelve weeks. The primary lesion may heal or, more often, become calcified or ossified in a complex that contains the From his study of vaccinated children at La Charité, he found a death rate of 0.8 percent. 37 Armed with this evidence, Calmette emulated his idol, Louis Pasteur. In 1924, he presented his work to the Academy of Medicine, and it was immediately taken up by the medical press. He was inundated with requests from French physicians for samples of BCG, which he sent them free of charge, in return for the doctors' observations; he used the responses to supplement his findings from the Charité hospital. In 1927, he published the final results and went on a whirlwind publicity tour, insisting that BCG offered a safe and effective means to prevent what remained the leading cause of death in France. 38 As Christian Bonah has shown, for Calmette as for Pasteur, laboratory work took pride of place in establishing the worth of a medical procedure. Calmette allotted only a few pages of his major 1927 presentation of BCG to statistical evidence while devoting more than one hundred pages to his laboratory work. Although he hired statisticians to validate his experiments, he ultimately treated statistical evidence as an afterthought, useful only to compensate for the practical limitations on human experimentation and to lend support to his laboratory work. 39 This fits with Harry Marks's observation that in the United States, even "in laboratory disciplines that had long ago embraced quantification, researchers still [the 1950s] regarded a merely statistical study as intellectually inferior to a carefully planned out program of experimental investigation." 40 Even before Calmette published his final results, a violent controversy erupted. Criticism of his work emerged on two fronts. The first challenge, and the one he found most upsetting, came from a veterinarian trained at the Pasteur Institute, and a fellow member of the French Academy of Medicine. In 1927, José Lignières insisted that the absence of lesions found during an animal autopsy did not prove that BCG was innocuous. Recognizing that most subjects supported the vaccine, he suggested that a live vaccine might nevertheless pose a risk for an unquantifiable minority of people, especially those with compromised immune systems. He was rebuffed the following year by Calmette, who suggested that as a veterinarian, Lignières lacked the standing to engage in debate. 41 A series of pediatricians and statisticians from Scandinavia and, especially, England issued a more damaging critique. They took immediate aim at Calmette's claim that 24 percent of infants born to parents with active TB would die within a year.
tubercle bacilli, preventing them from spreading through the body. At this point, the subject remains asymptomatic but will likely test tuberculin-positive. Unless treated with antibiotics, the infection will remain and may progress to active TB at a later date, often many years later, if the subject's immune system is compromised. 37 A careful study of unvaccinated children in a pair of Copenhagen dispensaries found an overall mortality rate of 7.7 percent within the first year, and a TB mortality rate of 4.9 percent. The authors corroborated their findings by comparing them with other contemporary studies, which had reached similar results. The magnitude of the reduction that Calmette claimed, from 24 percent to less than 1 percent, led others to wonder about selection bias: how did the children who received the vaccine compare to those who did not? 42 Perhaps the most searching questions came from University of London professor Major Greenwood, a central figure in the new field of epidemiology. How did Calmette select children to vaccinate? Were they separated from their parents long enough for the vaccine to take effect (as much as two months)? How were they fed and looked after? Different treatment in the first weeks of life, Greenwood asserted, could easily account for Calmette's findings. If the Copenhagen study was correct, and Greenwood thought that it was, the risk posed by TB was too small to measure with the sample sizes that Calmette had worked with, even if they were truly random. 43 His final conclusion was damning: "Dr. Calmette has deliberately appealed to the statistical method, and in my submission, his use of that method has been so gravely defective, that no confidence can be placed either in his statistical inferences or in the reliability of the data which he has assembled." In a similar vein, the Swedish pediatrician Arvid Wallgren accused Calmette of having gotten so carried away with enthusiasm for his new vaccine that he had overlooked the basic rules of logic. 44 BEFORE WORLD WAR I, SCIENTISTS would likely have solved this kind of standoff themselves. In this case, however, resolution came from a new international agency, the League of Nations Health Organization. For all that Calmette's hard-charging personality and the prestige of the Pasteur Institute had done to win over the French public, the international community remained hesitant about the new vaccine. The Health Organization operated on a shoestring budget. It lacked the legal standing or power to enforce its decisions. But that very weakness presented an opportunity: it conferred the appearance, at least, of neutrality, of objectivity, and thus the ability to arbitrate the competing claims of interested parties. 45 Moreover, widespread respect for its director, the charismatic Pasteur-trained Polish doctor Ludwik Rajchman, earned it considerable influence. Rajchman wanted to surpass the achievements of prewar international health organizations, which had been limited primarily to coordinating responses to epidemics. Distancing himself from his Anglo-French sponsors, he cultivated support from the Rockefeller Foundation to help guard his independence and take the initiative in making public health policy. Unable to fund ambitious field programs, he endeavored instead to establish international standards for biological products and to have his Health Organization act as an international agency for sanitary reform. 46 The BCG controversy presented Rajchman and his colleagues with an ideal opportunity. On short notice, in the fall of 1928, the organization's Health Committee invited a select group of leading experts to take part in a conference on the status of the new vaccine. Who convinced Rajchman to call the meeting? Was it Greenwood, in an effort to establish the power of the new discipline of medical statistics? Did Wallgren approach the League to save what he thought was a useful vaccine from its critics and to advance his own alternative method of delivery? Rajchman's close friend and colleague Thorwald Madsen, director of the Health Committee and its program in medical standardization, as well as the Danish Statens Serum Institute (which produced BCG), was surely interested. Perhaps Calmette sought to use the League to put the criticism to rest? If so, his efforts to influence the selection process had no effect, much to his consternation. Rajchman and Madsen selected the experts from hospitals, government agencies, and research institutes, primarily in Europe. With the help of Yves Biraud, a specialist in medical statistics, they directed the panel to pay special attention to the kind of proof that would be required to determine the vaccine's protective power. In deference to Calmette, they held the event at Pasteur's campus in Paris. 47 The expert panel, chaired by Danish statistician Harald Westergaard, roundly dismissed Lignières's critique of BCG. After a thorough review of the literature, the committee issued an official report accepting all of Calmette's claims for safety. The years of intensive testing, without documented mishaps attributable to BCG, impressed the experts:
It seems reasonable to say that nearly everyone who has published on BCG, either on an experimental level or in veterinary or human practice, agrees that it is innocuous at the doses prescribed by Professor Calmette and his collaborators; that efforts to provoke active tuberculosis with BCG have failed and that the hypothesis of its spontaneous return to virulence, a hypothesis contradicted by observation up to the present, shall remain in the realm of pure speculation for the foreseeable future. 48 Rajchman's study commission was not willing to condemn years of work by one of Europe's leading scientists on the basis of conjecture.
Nor, however, were the international experts on the commission prepared to 46 In addition to the works cited in fn. 3 above, see Marta A. Balinska, For the Good of Humanity: Ludwik Rajchman, Medical Statesman, trans. Rebecca Howell (Budapest, 1998) . 47 While the published minutes of the Health Committee indicate that Calmette proposed the conference, in private correspondence with Rajchman he had previously written that if Rajchman and Madsen were so inclined, he had no objection to a conference to study BCG; League of Nations Archives, -38 (1928-1929) [397. accept the claims for the vaccine's efficacy. Greenwood's attack on Calmette's statistical reasoning earned their full support. The experts were merciless on the subject of selection bias. Calmette, they pointed out in unison, had never explained how he selected which children to vaccinate; nor could he account for which children his study followed. He minimized the mortality rate of vaccinated children with a series of apparently careless errors. In the absence of autopsies, many of the deaths he attributed to "other causes" could well have resulted from tuberculosis. While the report writers were willing to admit that the mortality rate among vaccinated children in France was probably lower than the rate for the general population, just how much lower was impossible to say. 49 At the end of the conference, a Commission of Expert Statisticians set out guidelines for future research, which were published and circulated widely, to avoid the pitfalls of Calmette's work. The most challenging section insisted:
It is essential to use the method of sampling in selecting experimental (vaccinated) and control (unvaccinated) groups, preferably by vaccinating alternate infants in tuberculous families, in which the factors referred to in the special Sub-Committee's report . . . are comparable. 50 The statistical committee went beyond consultation and the sharing of information, as earlier international meetings had typically done; it handed down guidelines that vaccine developers were expected to follow. 51 This was hardly the crowning moment of Calmette's publicity tour, as historians of science have written. 52 The microbiologist replied bitterly to a colleague at the League: "How could such supposedly intelligent men come up with this? I forget which moralist said that statistics is the official language of liars. I'm beginning to think he was right and that, in any event, we cannot allow statisticians to have the final word on BCG." 53 The League's effort to establish guidelines for clinical research marks an important milestone in relations between statisticians and medical researchers. Even in England, home to the most important national bureau of medical statistics, the Medical Research Council (MRC), most of whose members had been trained by one of the key figures of modern epidemiology, Karl Pearson, statisticians appear to have had very little influence over the design of clinical trials before World War II. 54 49 Ibid., typescript report, "Note sur l'efficacité prémunisante du BCG chez l'homme," esp. 10-35. See also the preparatory memoranda by Drs. Siegfried Rosenfeld (Ministry for Social Administration, Vienna) and Professor Carl Prausnitz (State Institute of Hygiene, Breslau), and correspondence from Greenwood, who recommended that any testing be conducted outside France, all in SDN C.H./BCG/ 1-38 (1928) (1929) (Princeton, N.J., 2004) . For the MRC's sta-Doctors generally approached statisticians late in the day, to help minimize problems they encountered after experimental design was complete. Greenwood's student Austin Bradford Hill-who later designed the landmark trials of the antibiotic streptomycin (1948) and persuaded British clinicians to adopt the principles of controlled experimentation-wrote of his experience at the MRC in the 1920s and 1930s that he and Greenwood had "worked hard and well in correcting and improving the statistics in the reports the Council proposed to publish." 55 Desirée Cox-Maksimov found no evidence of written consultation between statisticians and clinicians before the war. 56 As one wag put it, "like the pathologist, the statistician was consulted only after the damage was done," to determine "what the experiment died of." 57 The recommendations issued by the League statisticians in 1929 posed enormous problems for Calmette and compelled him to start over with the help of professional statisticians. As the League itself recognized, the experts presented what they considered to be best practices, but those practices were not necessarily feasible. Rajchman's staff pointed out to Calmette that a truly systematic study would face insurmountable legal and administrative barriers, not to mention resistance from French family doctors. In reply to a proposal from Calmette, an attempt to accommodate the new guidelines, the League asked him:
How do you plan to impose systematic vaccination on all children, even the premature or disabled in a district? How, moreover, do you plan to prevent doctors in the other [control] district from performing a vaccination they deem beneficial? It would be difficult to justify the legal obligation to vaccinate in one district since the non-vaccination in the other would highlight the experimental character of the operation. 58 Accommodating the League became even more important the following year. In 1930, seventy-six newborns died in Lübeck, Germany, after being inoculated with contaminated doses of BCG. The Pasteur Institute was ultimately absolved, but the catastrophe resulted in a lengthy trial, which dominated news coverage and exacerbated doubts about the vaccine. Even though Calmette had been experiencing serious health problems, he persevered. "I've begun working again," he wrote to Charles Nicolle, the Nobel Prize-winning director of the Pasteur Institute in Tunis, "and cannot even think of rest. I have to go to Bern and Lausanne by train, to Bar- celona on April 13, always for BCG . . . You know, I'm out there on the barricades. This is no time to let up." 59 Calmette turned first to the French army. In fact, he had done so even before opposition to BCG arose. When he began sending samples of the vaccine to interested doctors in 1924, he took the liberty of approaching the French army command. For years the Pasteur Institute and army medical staff tested African soldiers, who doctors thought were less likely to have been exposed to the disease, working out the dosage for subcutaneous delivery. 60 Perhaps in response to Greenwood and the League, Calmette carried out random trials with control groups in 1929, to achieve "acceptable" levels of side effects such as cold abscesses, which initially sent many to the hospital. One virtue of testing the new vaccine on soldiers was that Calmette encountered no resistance from civil doctors. Military leaders had no qualms about forcing troops, especially African troops, to serve as test subjects for the good of the service. Despite the army's help, however, the trials proved inconclusive. TB rates among soldiers were too low by the late 1920s for a determination to be made about whether the vaccine made any appreciable difference. The director of the army's vaccine program concluded that soldiers did not make the best test subjects; they were too well fed and too healthy: "tuberculosis is extremely rare in both groups [vaccinated and control] . Appropriate testing would need to take place under less favorable conditions" to produce meaningful results. 61 To find less favorable conditions, Calmette looked to the colonies. As a former navy doctor and member of the medical staff for colonial troops, he had connections throughout the empire. He had played a central role in creating outposts of the Pasteur Institute in Saigon in 1904, as he had in Lille in 1895, and in reorganizing the Algiers Institute in 1909-1912. He had placed members at several other new overseas branches, including Tunis, Tangiers, and Dakar. Inaugurated in 1888 with a mix of private and public gifts and the proceeds from vaccine sales, the Pasteur Institute in Paris initially focused exclusively on rabies. Its activities quickly expanded, however, to include a mix of pure and applied sciences aimed at tackling all infectious diseases. 62 The overseas Pasteur institutes were charged with applying the pure science developed in Paris, although scientists in the colonies often chafed at playing such a subordinate role. Researchers went overseas to make careers, hoping to profit from exotic locales by discovering new diseases or cures. Tuberculosis research was not a high priority among them, but it was Calmette's singular obses- 59 Menut, "The Lübeck Catastrophe and Its Consequences for Anti-Tuberculosis BCG Vaccination"; and Calmette to Nicolle, February 21, 1930 The Pasteur Institute in Saigon vaccinated huge numbers of children. According to an internal report, the local institute administered some eight hundred doses a week throughout Cochin China in 1924 -1925. 63 Over the next half-dozen years, nurses vaccinated some 300,000 infants, and by the 1930s they were vaccinating more than 100,000 per year. 64 However, as Calmette himself recognized all too well in the wake of his encounters with statisticians, the number of vaccinations mattered little as a brute fact on its own. Without centralized administrative records, what the French call état-civil, doctors had no means of tracking the people they vaccinated. Calmette remarked: "In effect, the absence of état-civil and the resulting impossibility of finding mothers and children among the masses constitute virtually insurmountable obstacles. It must be acknowledged, moreover, that hospital patients often register under assumed names and give false addresses," thwarting any effort to study the effects of a vaccine, or any other treatment. 65 The northern coastal zone of Algeria was better served with the rudiments of an administrative state than more classically colonial territories. Unlike Indochina, Algeria had a functioning system of public records. 66 Its major cities-Oran, Constantine, Bône, and especially Algiers-with their predominantly European populations, enjoyed the most fully developed civil administration and public services in the empire outside the French mainland. After a pair of false starts, an 1882 law imposed the French état-civil on Algeria. Already in the late nineteenth century, French authorities had begun to create genealogical trees and to impose officially recognized names. Within a decade, they had recorded the names, birthdates, and marital status of more than 3 million Muslims; imperfect as it was, the civil bureaucracy in Algeria had been keeping basic administrative records for nearly fifty years by the time BCG became available. 67 The capital city of Algiers also suffered devastating levels of tuberculosis mortality. The disease began to alarm French colonial and medical authorities before the turn of the twentieth century. A member of the French Academy of Medicine, Victor Widal, told his colleagues in 1890:
that the root of the problem was not encountered in Algeria but brought from France . . . [I] f it can't be proven that we imported phthisis, we have at least helped propagate it. 68 He went on to note that during his nearly twelve years in Algeria, from 1853 to 1867, he had seen no more than perhaps twenty cases of pulmonary tuberculosis. Since then, however, there had been a dramatic increase. 69 TB constituted 2 percent of reported deaths in Algiers in 1838, 7.5 percent in 1860, and 14.7 percent, on average, for the years from 1900 to 1905. 70 By 1913, the general mortality rate in the Algiers Kasbah, where most Muslims lived, had reached 380 per 10,000, with TB the leading cause. 71 As in so many other areas, World War I magnified trends that were already under way. Tuberculosis mortality exploded during and then again after the war. Rudimentary statistics for tuberculosis become available in Europe only in the late nineteenth century. Doctors were not required to report TB cases in France until 1964, and recordkeeping in the colonies was always unreliable. Mortality rates in French Algeria must therefore be taken as orders of magnitude and not precise indicators, more trustworthy for European citizens than for Muslim subjects. In this regard, local hospital records can help establish rough benchmarks. According to the records for Algiers, provided by the director of the city's TB program at the Mustapha Hospital, the disease routinely accounted for less than 15 percent of hospital deaths for Europeans in the city in the 1920s; the Muslim share was consistently more than twice that number, hovering just over 30 percent in the same time period. 72 This ratio of 2:1-two Muslims dying of TB for every one European in a hospital setting-must have been lower than the ratio in Algeria as a whole. Given the glaring inequalities in access to medical care, it seems likely that a much greater percentage of European TB patients ended up in hospitals when they got sick, and thus the disparity in TB mortality rates between Europeans and Muslims was even wider than that 2:1 ratio. TB rates recorded for European settlers in Algiers were roughly the same as those in Paris at the time, which seems plausible. If those figures are correct, the Muslim rate was almost certainly greater than 50 per 10,000, and probably reached much higher levels. Referring to the TB epidemic, the head of the city's health office (the Bureau d'hygiène), Dr. Lemaire, said that "anyone who lives in the Kasbah has cut his life expectancy in half." 73 One of Lemaire's students recalled in his medical thesis: "We often diagnosed pulmonary phthisis just by listening to them cough and an affirmative response to the question, 'Have you been in France? ' " 74 positive. 75 The settler government proved deaf to appeals to address TB until it appeared the disease might spread to European neighborhoods. 76 Whether or not their mortality rates reached the recorded highs, the Muslims of Algiers clearly experienced one of the great TB epidemics of the twentieth century, obscured by population growth in Algeria as a whole. 77 If the figures recorded by the health office-which were routinely cited by well-informed local doctors-are correct, they are staggering: in the 1920s, Muslims in Algiers were four to five times more likely than Europeans to die of TB. 78 The levels at which Muslims suffered tuberculosis were comparable to those among blacks in South Africa at the height 75 Although the authors do not cite the sample size for this cell of their table, it appears to have been several thousand. 77 Louis Chevalier, Le problème démographique nord-africain (Paris, 1947); and Kamel Kateb, Européens, "indigènes" et juifs en Algérie (1830-1962) : Représentations et réalités des populations (Paris, 2001) . 78 Lemaire claimed that Muslims were six times more likely to be infected and suffered mortality rates three times higher than Europeans. He based that claim on different, less deadly, years in "La lutte contre la tuberculose en Algérie," Algérie médicale, 4th ser., 37, no. 67 (July 1933) : 487. of the mining boom and apartheid years, in terms of both the TB mortality rate (in devastated areas) and the disparity between dominant and subaltern groups; and they were greater than the 66 per 10,000 suffered by the Parisian Communards during the Prussian siege of 1870-1871 and the 60 per 10,000 Jews who died of TB in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1942. 79 When the statistical experts at the League of Nations asked for random groups of subjects living in areas with rampant tuberculosis who could be monitored over a period of years, Algeria was the only place in the French Empire where it was practical to undertake such work. The Pasteur Institute provided vaccines and laboratory services, as local branches did elsewhere. Leading Pasteur scientists worked with the medical faculty in Algiers: they helped train doctors and collaborated in public health campaigns. Those ties enabled Calmette to enlist the colonial government's help where others, offering vastly greater resources, had failed. The director of public health services in Algeria, the indefatigable Lucien Raynaud, sought out the support of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1923 for his chronically underfunded office. The director of the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Board in New York, Frederick Russell, showed immediate interest and dispatched his deputy, Selskar Gunn, to Algeria the next fall. Gunn spent three weeks in Algeria and returned an enthusiastic advocate. 80 Raynaud clearly made a good impression. Richard Pearce, who accompanied Gunn, noted in his diary: "Raynaud in public health is a corker-splendid administrator and excellent grasp of problems, but he finds Government slow to furnish funds for anything not already on paper." 81 This auspicious start soon collapsed, when the new Socialist governor-general of Algeria, Maurice Violette, proved wary of outside influences and dissuaded Raynaud from working with the Americans. 82 He could not, however, turn down Calmette's advances. With the help of the French government in Algeria, Calmette took a haphazard vaccine program like the ones in Indochina, in Senegal, and on the French mainland and, by 1935, turned it into a random trial with a control group that continued into the 1950s. UNLIKE THE CADASTRAL SURVEYS and censuses carried out by the British Raj after the 1857 mutiny or the state-sponsored urban reform projects in Morocco following World War I, the Algiers BCG trial was run by a para-public research institute. If it took advantage of inequalities wrought by the French presence in Algeria, this was no "high modernist" attempt to mark boundaries or remake the world. 83 It was a defensive effort to respond to scientific critics and would-be regulators.
The Pasteur Institute in Algiers had created a lab to produce BCG before controversy erupted in Europe, around the same time Calmette gave his work-in-progress lecture at the Academy of Medicine (1924) . For the first few years, the local branch of the Pasteur Institute gave samples to doctors and veterinarians who requested them, and began recording their own efforts at shelters and dispensaries in several cities. In the wake of the public controversies of 1927-1928 and the Lübeck catastrophe, Yves Biraud, director of epidemiology at the League of Nations, joined the team in Algiers. Biraud had worked with Calmette before, reviewing and helping to present the initial statistical evidence that Calmette published in 1927 to buttress his laboratory work. Now the microbiologist called in Biraud, the statistician, in the initial stages to help design the study. 84 Under Biraud's watch, the Algiers team limited their purview. Instead of working with dispensaries wherever they could find them, they concentrated on the Kasbah, with a population density of more than 2,000 people per hectare. 85 The authors asserted that focusing on a single poor neighborhood reduced the possibility of selection bias. All of the families there endured the same grinding poverty. Children had no opportunity to escape to a wet nurse or a healthy environment in the countryside. During the three years of the study, 4,260 children were born in the second arrondissement. The team vaccinated more than half of them, then compared their mortality over time to that of the unvaccinated, as a control. At this stage, they calculated that BCG decreased the general mortality rate by 29 percent for the first year of life. 86 In 1935, the Algiers team moved to a fully randomized trial with a control group. Following the League's guidelines, Pasteur researchers published their research plan. The vaccine would be administered by mouth to newborns in their homes, "under medical conditions," with revaccinations at specified intervals: at one, three, seven, and fifteen years of age. All procedures would be followed "like a laboratory experiment." The campaign would cover more than 40,000 subjects, more than 20,000 vaccinated and another 20,000 unvaccinated as a control, over the course of a generation. 87 The scope of the study bears comment. (Geneva, 1925) ; he had served as an independent expert for Calmette's initial studies of BCG on the mainland, and would later become the director of epidemiology for the World Health Organization. See fn. 8 above on the Algiers branch of the Pasteur Institute.
85 To be precise, 2,255 per hectare in 1926. René Lespès, Alger: É tude de géographie et d'histoire urbaines (Paris, 1930) . 86 Edmond Sergent, Henriette Ducros-Rougebief, and Yves Biraud, "Enquête sur les résultats de la vaccination antituberculeuse par le BCG dans la Casba d'Alger dans les années 1931-1932-1933 a controlled test on the use of lemons in the treatment of scurvy in the 1740s, the first semi-random experimental trial was carried out in Denmark in the 1890s: Johannes Fibiger gave diphtheria antitoxin to several hundred patients on successive days. In the twentieth century, between the world wars, the British MRC struggled to coordinate semi-random trials of serum treatment for pneumonia in several research settings in England and Scotland, applying the same methods Fibiger had used a generation earlier. 88 In the United States, the Cooperative Clinical Group, a collaborative effort to evaluate syphilis treatments, struggled to construct a sample of 150 patients in the 1920s. 89 The Algiers BCG trial was the largest trial yet attempted that was coordinated in a single setting, and its randomization was the most sophisticated until the MRC's streptomycin trials after World War II.
The Algiers Pasteur Institute worked in the Kasbah, taking advantage of the neighborhood's poverty in a way that Calmette had not been able to do with African soldiers in France: "With families this destitute, this malnourished, over-crowded and vulnerable to the elements, the risk of disease is extreme. Mortality rates, not only from tuberculosis but from all pulmonary and intestinal afflictions . . . , are extremely high. The slightest reduction in general mortality, coincident with the use of BCG, would be highly significant." 90 Here the reference is not to the moral impact of success, but to the statisticians' complaints about trials involving African soldiers, in which almost no one in the control group got sick. There was no discussion of the ethical problems posed by working in the Kasbah.
A team of certified visiting nurses-European women, most likely from the French mainland-administered the vaccinations. 91 At first there were only two nurses, but by 1946 there were fourteen, working in teams of two or three. On appointed afternoons, the nurses noted the names and addresses of all newborns declared by Muslim families the day before at their local city hall. The governor-general of Algeria had no hesitation about granting the Pasteur Institute (illegal) access to Muslim families' personal records, which was essential so that a random sample could be created. The nurses wrote down the names in a special register and numbered them: even numbers were vaccinated with BCG; odd numbers were observed as a control. The nurses contacted the families and administered the oral vaccine the following morning; then they returned to administer two successive doses with two days in between. They visited and observed the control group on the same timetable, without giving a placebo. In both cases (vaccinated and non-vaccinated), the nurses referred patients to local clinics for any health problems they discovered. "Very quickly," the authors noted, "the mothers appreciated the solicitude shown them, and when a child is born in their neighborhood, they wait for the nurse to come and then follow her." 92 The Muslim reaction to the vaccination effort remains difficult to assess. Al-88 Accepting patients for a trial on alternating days to achieve a random sample can introduce bias if doctors know which days count toward their study. Pasteur researchers also benefited, perhaps unwittingly, from an ongoing publicity campaign in favor of the vaccine that had been launched several years before their study got under way in a systematic manner. Calmette was already convinced that BCG was safe and effective, and he wanted to vaccinate as many children as possible. Several clinics and a dispensary near the Kasbah had begun vaccinating children in the late 1920s, so BCG was not unknown. The public health office supported them by plastering the following tract, in Arabic, on the walls of buildings in the Kasbah, publishing it in the local Arabic press, and handing it out to families:
PROTECT YOUR CHILDREN AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS Everyone knows this is a terrible disease, and its contagiousness is undeniable. In your families, in your houses, a person with tuberculosis poses a real danger to everyone, especially young children. Do not hesitate to vaccinate them against this disease. The vaccine that has been discovered by the French savants MM. Calmette and Guérin is absolutely safe . . . Spread this information broadly in your neighborhood. Good health is a right for rich and poor alike. Thousands of French children have been vaccinated, and more are vaccinated every day. These are not trials that are being carried out ; we want your children to benefit from the progress of French medicine. Just as you vaccinate your children against smallpox, do the same to protect them from the terrible tuberculosis. 96 The tract said that BCG was the standard of care, the pride of the French medical establishment. It also insisted that the testing phase for the vaccine was complete.
93 Gouvernement général d'Algérie, "Rapport sur la situation politique et administrative des indigènes," quarterly, 1920-1925 Indeed, Calmette had claimed no less to anyone who would listen during his publicity tour several years earlier. 97 Compliance rates were initially high, and the ability of the Pasteur teams to follow subjects over decades suggests that there was at least a bare minimum of acceptance, if not more. According to Pasteur reports, the scientists expanded their study outside the Kasbah-that is, they changed the scope of the study and compromised its statistical power-at the request of mothers from nearby neighborhoods who saw the teams from across the street and wanted their children to have access to the new vaccine. 98 It no doubt helped that the trial was run by a metropolitan research institute, with metropolitan nurses, as opposed to male representatives of the settler government, who tended to blame the local inhabitants for conditions in the Kasbah and the TB crisis. At least two contemporary medical theses corroborate the institute's claim that families welcomed them with open arms, and Pasteur researchers themselves noted quite candidly years later, during the Algerian War, that they had lost public confidence. 99 The institute called off the trial when Algerian nationalists assassinated the nurses' driver in 1956. 100 The Algiers BCG trial ran for twenty-six years, yielding encouraging but not definitive results. Working with larger samples and avoiding the selection bias of earlier studies produced more sober numbers, generally showing that the mortality rate in the first year was roughly 3 percent lower for the vaccinated than for the control group. Given the numbers of people sampled and the extremely high general mortality rate, that was a significant improvement. The protection conferred, moreover, appeared impressive for the youngest age groups-BCG cut the general mortality rate by nearly 60 percent for children below the age of 11. It is critical to stress, however, that the scientists never showed what part a decline in TB mortality played in that larger trend. 101 THE ALGIERS TRIAL RAISES far-reaching ethical questions. Unlike sleeping sickness or malaria, TB remained a major problem on the French mainland in the interwar years: the Pasteur Institute went to Algeria exclusively for political expediency. Calmette and his colleagues violated the confidentiality of Algerian Muslims' personal records (état-civil ) and, it appears, failed to obtain informed consent as well. The sources are 97 It also calls into question the Pasteur Institute's ability to abide by the guidelines that League statisticians imposed. The same policies that made testing difficult on the mainland may have skewed results in Algiers. Giving out BCG free of charge to any doctor or clinic that requested it surely tainted the control group. Although Geneviève Bottin notes that the Kasbah was a living laboratory for the Pasteur Institute, she also notes that every child in the Mustapha Hospital maternity ward was vaccinated and lists a range of dispensaries, doctors, midwives, and clinics that vaccinated thousands. It remains unclear whether the Pasteur Institute stopped sending BCG to those groups once their study got under way. Bottin, Prophylaxie de la tuberculose infantile en Algérie (thèse de médecine, University of Algiers, 1941), 81-83. 98 Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebief provide no explanation for the decision, saying only that they granted mothers' wishes; "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 3. 99 Forgeot, La tuberculose pulmonaire chez les nourrissons arabes et kabyles à Alger ; and Bottin, Prophylaxie de la tuberculose infantile en Algérie.
100 IP, IPO.B 1 (1956) . 101 To do so would have required autopsies and raised the cost of the study. Sergent, Catanei, and Ducros-Rougebief, "Prémunition antituberculeuse par le BCG," 131-137. notably silent, for example, on the subject of the propaganda campaign on behalf of BCG before the trial began. Researchers viewed the trial as a service to the Muslim community and gave no thought to any special protections that might be appropriate in a study carried out on such a vulnerable population. In response to powerful taboos against experiments on healthy human subjects, Pasteur researchers failed in Algiers, as they had on the mainland, to provide clear statements about their study's intent. They took advantage of their subjects' poverty and the absence of independent general practitioners ultimately for their own ends. It is critical to stress that informed consent was not included in formal ethical guidelines until after World War II, and Pasteur researchers took advantage of poor patients in the Charité maternity ward as well. The initial study of BCG vaccination in Paris made no mention of consent, although Calmette felt compelled to suggest that he had obtained it when he presented his work in Paris for public approval (but not in Algiers), suggesting that scientists appreciated the principle before its formal adoption. 102 The major difference was that running the BCG trial in Algiers allowed the Pasteur team to withhold treatment from patients and create a valid statistical control.
By the standards of its day, before the Nuremberg Code (1947) or the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) , the human experiment carried out in Algiers was relatively benign. 103 Western scientists provided access to cutting-edge care that had virtually no side effects with oral delivery and that significantly reduced the death toll in a very deadly neighborhood. They did not inoculate children with tuberculosis, as Austrian doctors did as the Algiers trial was being carried out. 104 They did not impose lumbar punctures or inject patients with Atoxyl, an arsenic-based drug that can cause blindness, as their Pasteur colleague Eugène Jamot did when he was competing with German scientists to find a cure for sleeping sickness in sub-Saharan Africa. 105 But the Algiers BCG trial did anticipate some of the moral problems raised by AIDS research in contemporary Africa and Asia. Most of the ethical debate has centered on the use of placebos and the withholding of a known effective treatment-a long course of zidovudine (AZT)-to see whether a short course could reduce motherto-child transmission of HIV infection; some scholars and activists have challenged the validity of consent obtained in developing countries. But there were other questions raised by the AZT trials that have become increasingly important in the years since they were carried out. Ethicists began to move beyond a procedural emphasis on informed consent and clinical practice. They have increasingly emphasized the risk that research subjects assume and the value they contribute to drug development, insisting that trial subjects receive fair benefits, if not delivery of the proven interventions that their participation helped create. The 2001 Hastings Center Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries stressed that "as the benefits to the sponsors, researchers, and others outside the population increase, the benefits to the host population should also increase." 106 These considerations have become pressing around the world in recent years with the dramatic growth in industry-sponsored trials in developing countries, as clinical research increasingly serves as a surrogate for underfunded state healthcare systems.
COLONIES AND QUASI-COLONIAL TERRITORIES such as Algeria were useful to reformers not because they were empty but because they offered unique opportunities. They brought together authoritarian governments willing to overlook their subjects' interests in a way that no democratic state could, often unique ecological conditions, and, in some instances, cutting-edge technical capacity. Recent debates about colonial modernity show no signs of abating, in large part because the combination of those variables, and of local state resources, has varied widely. The most influential work on colonial reform projects has concentrated on extreme cases-state-sponsored urbanism and population policy, on the one hand, and penitentiaries, on the other. 107 Responding to powerful international pressure, the Algiers BCG trial fit between those extremes. The initial impetus for running a randomized trial with a control came from pragmatic reformers with ties to Geneva. They initiated a public debate about the relative weight that should be accorded to different kinds of technical expertise. Calmette's answer to their challenge, the Algiers trial, bought him time and goodwill. That response, and the Pasteur Institute's decision to bring Health Committee epidemiologists on board, not only to review data but to help design trials from the outset, kept international experts from turning against the new vaccine when they were ready to do so. It also, inadvertently, reinforced the League's au-thority to define standards for clinical trials at the expense of French voters and, especially, family doctors, who resented challenges to their clinical judgment.
Calmette's ability to call upon associates in Algiers and throughout the French Empire suggests the need to rethink basic assumptions about French colonialism. The same kinds of social and political inequality that enabled "specific intellectuals" to conduct experiments overseas created opportunities for Parisian mandarins as well. 108 The French colonies were not as isolated from metropolitan conflicts, patronage networks, and patterns of influence as most work on colonial modernity has contended. But Algeria did serve as a laboratory in this case for a human experiment that combined traditional paternalism with a kind of medical modernity in complex and contradictory ways. By falling back on national, colonial, and quasi-colonial resources, Calmette was able to parry a threat posed by a newly powerful international agency. He was able to overcome practical and political challenges to vaccine testing on an unprecedented scale.
The Algiers trial failed to provide conclusive proof of BCG's efficacy, but it cemented a lasting partnership with the League of Nations. After World War II, doctors at the much more powerful and better-funded World Health Organization, the League Health Organization's successor, worked with Calmette's successors at the Pasteur Institute to conduct massive BCG vaccination campaigns throughout North Africa and in dozens of countries around the world. 109 The vaccine was inexpensive and easier to administer than any other form of TB control, and it appeared to offer a significant, if unspecified, level of protection. It fit the postwar fascination with technology and its power to reshape the world in the era of eradication campaigns. 110 The postwar campaigns were among the largest undertakings in the World Health Organization's history. 111 Despite continued doubts over its protective powers, which remain uncertain, Calmette's vaccine is still one of the most widely used in the world, administered to roughly 100 million children every year. 112 The very success of controlled clinical trials as a means of evaluating medical interventions poses great challenges today. Human testing is the most expensive part of vaccine development, and the available pool of research subjects is shrinking in saturated Western markets. Pharmaceutical companies have responded to these pressures and the demands of regulatory agencies by shifting their trials from disadvantaged domestic groups to poor countries overseas. 113 As in interwar Algiers, clinical trials in developing countries often offer the only means that sick people have to obtain basic medical care, blurring the already fuzzy distinction between research and treatment. Basic moral questions remain unresolved: Who assumes the risk in vaccine and drug development? Who benefits? How are health resources allocated between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor communities more generally? Like many pharmaceutical companies today, the Pasteur Institute resorted to a study in a poor country to prove the worth of its new product and to make good on a significant investment. Unlike those companies-which devote 90 percent of their research to conditions that make up 10 percent of the global disease burden, in a quest to find blockbuster drugs for the developed world-Calmette and his colleagues sought a remedy for a problem that was devastating test subjects and their community. 114 At the behest of international experts in Geneva, they obtained results faster and much more easily than they could have in Europe, in an effort to prevent a disease that was ravaging, and continues to ravage, the developing world.
114 Sameera Al-Tuwaijri et al., The 10/90 Report on Health Research, 2003 -2004 (Geneva, 2004 Press, 2006) . This article is drawn from his current project on the spread of TB from France to Algeria and back, and efforts to combat that spread, from 1830 to the present.
